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Stephen Shay and Victoria Summers have done an excellent job in
commenting on the international implications of the various proposals to
replace the U.S. federal income tax with a consumption tax.' In particular, as compared with previous discussions, Shay and Summers have
made significant contributions in comparing the relative merits of destination- versus origin-based proposals, and in dealing with the complexi-

ties of applying the proposals to services in general and financial
services in particular. 2
So as not to repeat what has been said elsewhere on this topic, I
will focus on three points, which may assist in situating the discussion
into a broader context: (1) the role of simplification in tax reform proposals; (2) the historical context of the relationship of the United States
to the international tax regime and its implications for tax reform; and
(3) a best-case scenario for the outcome of fundamental tax reform and
its implications.
I.

THE ROLE OF SIMPLIFICATION

One of the most common criticisms of the current U.S. income tax
regime is that it is terribly complicated. This complexity can be
* Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I would like to thank the participants in
the Institute (especially my co-panelists, Stephen Shay and Michael Graetz), as well as Louis
Kaplow and Alvin Warren, for their extremely helpful comments on this Comment.
1. See Stephen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected International Aspects of
Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. MtIdm L. REv. 1029 (1997).
2. For previous discussions of this issue, see Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The
International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619 (Dec. 1995);
JAMES R. HINES, JR., FundamentalTax Reform in an InternationalSetting, in ECONomIc EFFECTS
OF FuNDAmENTA TAX REox~m 465 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996); STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO
REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, [1995] 82 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 29, pt. 2 (June
15, 1995); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: Some International
Implications, 33 SAN DmIo L. REv. 1329 (1997).

1085

1086

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1085

explained in part by the historical evolution of the Internal Revenue
Code as a series of repeated attempts by Congress to close loopholes
discovered by taxpayers, and in part by a desire to compromise between
a pure income tax and a consumption tax (the so-called "hybrid" tax
system). Both causes of complexity are said to be reduced by fundamental tax reform, the first by sweeping away much of the Code and
starting on a clean slate, and the second by unequivocally opting for a
consumption tax base.
The problem with this optimistic view of tax reform is that there are
already signs that simplicity may not be achievable in a complex economy in which taxpayers are eager both to lobby for specific relief and to
exploit loopholes. For example, the USA tax proposal,3 even before
going through the legislative process, is made significantly more complex by attempts to satisfy various interest groups (e.g., by ensuring a
continued preference for state and local bonds) and attempts to prevent
loopholes from arising (e.g., the provisions aimed at preventing taxpayers from deducting investments in the stock of corporations formed to
hold assets that are ineligible for the deduction for savings).
Given that simplification is an important goal of tax reform,
increased attention should be given to the issues of administrability and
complexity in evaluating the various reform proposals. Specifically, in
comparing destination- to origin-based taxes in the international context,
one should focus on the superior potential of the former variety of consumption tax (such as the USA tax and the retail sales tax)4 to address
the transfer pricing issue. This problem continues to be a major challenge to the IRS and other tax administrations, as the current effort to
develop advance pricing agreements makes clear. Under a destinationbased tax, because imports are subject to tax, there is no incentive from
the perspective of the U.S. tax system to inflate the prices of goods
imported into the United States. Under an origin-based system like the
Flat Tax, 5 on the other hand, there continues to be such an incentive
because imported goods are fully deductible as business inputs and are
not subject to import tax of any kind. For this reason, and for the reasons given by Shay and Summers, a destination-based tax is superior to
an origin-based tax.
In addition, it is not clear why the United States has to "re-invent
the wheel." As Shay and Summers point out, all other OECD members
except Australia and many other countries have developed consumption
3. See USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).
4. See National Retail Sales Act of 1996, H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996).
5. See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995); S.
1050, 104th Cong. (1995).
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taxes in the form of a destination-based value-added tax ("VAT"). In an
increasingly integrated world economy, it would certainly seem to make
sense (if only to save on transaction costs by learning from the experience of others) to adopt a consumption tax similar to those adopted elsewhere in the world. Charles McLure, for example, has envisaged a
world in which all countries have only a destination-based consumption
tax.6 As he points out, one of the major advantages in such a world
would be ease of coordination and avoidance of double taxation in the
absence of treaties that would result from uniform use of the destination
principle. This "best-case" scenario is discussed further below, but for
present purposes it should be noted that its administrative potential
depends to some extent on the United States adopting a system that is
compatible with those of other countries, such as the destination-based
VAT. Whether such a tax should replace the income tax or, as in other
countries, be added to it (perhaps, if one wanted to be revenue neutral
and compensate for regressivity, with a significant increase in the
income tax exemption) is a different issue.
II.

Ti

UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL

TAX

REGIME

Michael Graetz and Michael O'Hear published a fascinating article
on the history of international taxation, and specifically the U.S. role
there.7 Graetz and O'Hear describe how the "grand compromise" underlying the international tax regime, i.e., the decision to allocate the right
to tax passive income primarily to residence countries and business
income primarily to source countries, was reached in the 1920s both in
the United States and in the international arena. They describe the leading role played in the formation of this compromise by the United States
(through the unilateral adoption of the foreign tax credit in 1918), and
specifically by T.S. Adams, who was a key advisor to the U.S. Treasury
and who also played a major role in developing the League of Nations
model treaty, which is the source of all later models and tax treaties.
On several other occasions, the United States has played a decisive
role in shaping the current international tax regime by unilateral action.
First, in the early 1960s, the United States adopted the Subpart F regime
for limiting deferral for controlled foreign corporations to active income.
This regime has since been copied by all other members of the OECD,
including countries with an exemption system.' Second, in the 1960s
6. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxationfor Income
Taxes as the InternationalNorm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992).

7. Michael J. Graetz & Michael O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021 (1997).
8. See BRIAN J. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1986).
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and again in the 1990s, the United States played a decisive role in translating the arm's length standard for transfer pricing into detailed rules
that have since been copied by the OECD and other countries. 9
In all of the above instances, the United States has contributed to
preventing both double taxation (in the first case) and zero taxation (in
the second and third). But the United States can also play a less positive
role. This is exemplified by the unilateral enactment of the portfolio
interest exemption in 1984, which was deliberately designed to make the
United States a tax haven for portfolio investment regardless of the
effect on the international tax regime, and which was also followed by
other countries.
Shay's and Summers' excellent discussion of the potential reaction
by other countries to replacement of the United States income tax by a
consumption tax should be placed in this historical context. From an
income tax perspective, it most resembles the portfolio interest exemption, in that it would make the United States into a tax haven not just for
portfolio interest, but for investments of any kind. If one assumes (as
Shay and Summers do) that other countries would want to keep an
income tax, such a unilateral move by the United States would be an
invitation to a tax war, whereby those countries each attempt to capture
the tax base forgone by the United States.10 This would be the worstcase scenario, which would lead to an unraveling of the international tax
regime and increase potential for double or zero taxation, with all the
ensuing costs. It would be ironic if the United States were to play this
role after having, as Graetz and O'Hear carefully document, contributed
so much to the initial formation of a compromise in an area where compromise is notoriously difficult to reach.
III.

THE BEST-CASE SCENARIO" 1

What, however, if McLure's scenario comes to pass, and all other
countries simply abolish their income taxes and replace them with consumption taxes? 2 Certainly, it is conceivable that such an outcome
would flow from unilateral United States action. Moreover, McLure
identifies two major advantages to a world with no income taxes. The
first is that from an efficiency perspective, both capital export neutrality
and capital import neutrality could be achieved simultaneously, which
9. For a discussion of the U.S. role in the 1960s, see Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary
Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAX NoTEs 625 (Feb. 17, 1986); for a discussion of
later developments, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and FallofArm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 15 VA. TAx REv. 89 (1995).

10. For a more elaborate discussion of this scenario, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 2.
11. As will become clear, this refers to the best one can hope for, not the best we would want.
12. See McLure, supra note 6.
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would require uniformity of rates, if all investment income were taxed at
a zero rate. The second, which McLure first pointed out, is that in a
world with only destination-based consumption taxes, double taxation
would be automatically avoided without the need for an elaborate tax
treaty network.
Thus, there are definite advantages to this best-case scenario. However, there may also be costs in terms of what Peggy Musgrave calls
"inter-nation equity," i.e., the allocation of the tax base among countries.
Currently, most countries tax both income and consumption. Consumption taxes are levied by both developed and developing countries under
the destination principle on domestic consumption (indeed, it would be
very hard for most countries to tax foreign consumption). Income taxes
are levied, in the case of passive income, by residence countries, which
tend to be developed countries (because developing countries find it difficult to tax passive income earned by their residents abroad). In the
case of active income, the tax is levied at source by both developed and
developing countries. Thus, for developing countries, taxing active
income at source is the major source of revenue other than the domestic
income and consumption of residents, which tend to be relatively
limited.
The fundamental difference between an income and a consumption
tax from this perspective is that a country imposing an income tax would
apply it to both production and consumption, because international rules
allow taxing active income at source, and the source of active income
includes where the product is produced or the service rendered. A consumption tax, on the other hand, applies only to consumption, not to
production. But the current distribution of consumption and production
vary significantly; consumption is highly concentrated in developed
countries, while production, because of the constant search by multinationals for less costly production locations, is much more evenly spread
between developed and developing countries. Because of this phenomenon, a universal switch to a consumption tax could result in significant
reductions of the taxing jurisdictions of developing countries.
In more concrete terms, the fundamental issue for each country is
whether it will be able to maintain the same revenue level with a consumption tax that it now usually achieves with a combination of income
and consumption taxes. The answer is likely to be "yes" for the United
States, because the absence of a federal consumption tax means that tax
reform can relatively easily be revenue-neutral, with one tax replacing
another, although the impact on state retail sales taxes is unclear. The
answer is also likely to be "yes" for a country like Japan, which relies
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heavily on income taxes despite the existence of a low (three percent,
scheduled to rise to five percent) consumption tax.
Revenue neutrality will be harder to maintain in European countries, because they already levy consumption tax with double digit rates
(sometimes above twenty percent), and revenue neutrality may require
VATs with rates of forty percent or more.1 3 Whether such rates of VAT
are politically feasible, given the perception of regressivity, remains to
be seen, but the potential at least exists, because consumption levels are
relatively high.
In the case of developing countries, however, revenue neutrality
will be extremely hard to maintain. Even currently, the elite of such
countries tend to consume abroad, and because of the low overall
income of the general population, domestic consumption is relatively
limited. It is hard to imagine such countries switching to a consumption
tax, forgoing their ability to tax production, and yet maintaining revenue
neutrality.
It may be argued that nothing would prevent developing countries
from maintaining income taxes even if the developed ones were to abandon them in favor of consumption taxes. But this ignores the reality that
developing countries will find it extremely difficult to attract investments if they alone tax investors on their income. In addition, in the
absence of an income tax treaty network and coordinated international
efforts to combat transfer pricing, it is difficult to see how developing
countries could unilaterally enforce an income tax on multinational businesses without cooperation from developed countries.
A likely outcome of a global shift to consumption taxes, thus,
would be the maintenance of revenue neutrality in the United States and
Japan, and perhaps in European nations (although in the case of the latter, an overall reduction in government revenues seems more likely), but
a significant reduction in revenues by developing countries, at least until
consumption levels in the developing world caught up with current
levels in the developed world. The main beneficiaries from such a shift
would likely be multinationals operating in developing countries (and
the suppliers of capital, if the general assumptions about the incidence of
the corporate tax are correct). These multinationals currently pay some
tax on their production activities in developing countries, if only in the
form of withholding taxes on their dividends and royalties (since taxation of operating income may be minimal because of enforcement difficulties and tax competition). Whether such a shift of resources from
governments to multinationals is likely to benefit the population of the
13. This may also be true in the United States unless the consumption tax has no exemptions
(a highly unlikely scenario).
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countries involved is debatable. In any case, the proponents of fundamental tax reform in the United States and elsewhere should address
these types of questions, which have not been the focus of much attention in the tax reform discussions to date.

